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Abstract
The National Guard is establishing Cyber Mission Teams (CMT) that will fulfill a federal
role to backfill active duty defending Department of Defense networks, but are also exploring
how they could effectively fulfill state missions. The President, Council of Governors, and
USCYBERCOM Commander have expressed concerns about U.S. critical infrastructure
cyber network vulnerabilities and the increasing magnitude of threat our adversaries pose to
those networks’ security. This article explores using this emerging National Guard capability
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/
vol8/iss4/1
in a state role for protection of critical infrastructure cyber networks. Most of the critical
infrastructure is privately owned. Although current executive orders and policy mandate
government sharing of cyber threat information, private providers’ reciprocation of sharing
their vulnerabilities is voluntary. This article contends that effective cyber defense requires
strong private-public partnerships. We developed a critical infrastructure cyber defense
model based upon key characteristics from the literature on private-public partnerships and
performed a case study of current cyber defense partnerships to validate the model. Our
research shows this model to be a useful guide for emerging National Guard Cyber Mission
Forces to consider when establishing partnerships for effective critical infrastructure cyber
defense.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/
vol8/iss4/1
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Introduction 
 
Approximately 85 percent of America’s critical infrastructure is owned and 
operated by private industry.1  According to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), the daily operations of our nation’s critical 
infrastructure are controlled by Industrial Control Systems (ICS).  Initially, 
ICS had little resemblance to traditional information technology systems in 
that ICS were isolated systems running proprietary control protocols using 
specialized hardware and software.  Remote maintenance access to ICS 
systems is more prevalent now since low-cost Internet Protocol devices are 
widely available.  This has made ICS systems more susceptible to outside 
threats.2  In 2014, over 52,000 cyber security incidents occurred on some 
form of critical infrastructure network.3 
 
Attacks in the past ten years have shown that an attack from cyberspace could 
seriously damage or disrupt our energy infrastructure.  In January 2014, 
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, the vice chair of the National 
Governors Association, warned his fellow governors that, “the next battlefront 
is likely not a field or town, but a computer network that supports our critical 
infrastructure.”4  According to Admiral Michael Rogers, the USCYBERCOM 
commander, in his March 4, 2015 testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee, “The U.S. government, the states and the private sector can’t 
defend their information systems on their own against the most powerful 
cyber forces.”  He also commented that, “We believe potential adversaries 
might be leaving cyber fingerprints on our critical infrastructure, partly to 
convey a message that our homeland is at risk if tensions ever escalate toward 
military conflict.”5  The costs to harden the US energy sector against cyber-
attacks are projected to be more than $7 billion by 2020 for the electric power 
industry and nearly $2 billion by 2018 for the oil and gas industry.  Now, 
                                                          
1 Nathan E. Busch, and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland 
Security Opportunities and Challenges,” Homeland Security Affairs 8 (October 2012). 
2 Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, and Karen Scarfone, “Guide to Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) Security,” NIST Special Publication (2011): 800-82. 
3 Verizon Corporation, “2015 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon, 2015, 
available at: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/ 
4 William Matthews, ʺCyber Uncertainty,ʺ National Guard: The Official Publication of the 
National Guard Association of the United States, July 2014, available at:  
http://nationalguardmagazine.com/display_article.php?id=1764536&id_issue=21806
6 
5 Cheryl Pellerin, “CYBERCOM Chief: Cyber Threats Blur Roles, Relationships,” Official 
Wire, March 6, 2015, available at: http://www.officialwire.com/news/cybercom-chief-
cyber-threats-blur-roles-relationships/ 
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more than ever, there is a higher need for more efficient critical infrastructure 
cyber defense.6  
  
Federal Role in Homeland Cyber Defense 
Executive Order 13636 mandates the Secretary of Homeland Security in 
collaboration with the Secretary of Defense will provide classified cyber threat 
and technical information to eligible private critical infrastructure 
companies.7  While the sharing of that information by private industry is 
highly encouraged, it is purely voluntary. 
  
One result of this mandate was the establishment of the National 
Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which serves 
as a 24/7 centralized location for the coordination and integration of cyber 
situational awareness and incident management.  NCCIC partners include all 
federal departments and agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments; the private sector; and international entities.  The NCCIC 
provides its partners with enhanced situational awareness of cybersecurity 
and communications incidents and risks, and provides timely information to 
manage vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents.  In 2014, the NCCIC received 
over 97,000 incident reports, and issued nearly 12,000 actionable cyber-
alerts or warnings.  NCCIC teams also detected over 64,000 vulnerabilities on 
federal and non-federal systems and directly responded to 115 significant 
cyber incidents.8  The NCCIC also relies heavily on voluntary collaboration 
with its partners.  The Center provides, free of charge, penetration analysis 
and vulnerability assessments on cyber networks for critical infrastructure 
providers in a private-public partnership (PPP). 
   
National Guard Role in Homeland Cyber Defense 
In 2013, lawmakers in Congress introduced the Cyber Warrior Act that would 
create a Guard Cyber and Network Incident Response Team for each state.  
The teams would leverage private-sector IT experts in the Guard and could be 
called on by governors and the defense secretary to respond to cyber 
                                                          
6 A. Kambour, Enhancing the Cybersecurity of Energy Systems and Infrastructure 
(Washington, D.C.: National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, August 4, 
2014). 
7 Barrack Obama, “Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,” February 12, 2013, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity  
8 Andy Ozment, NPPD Office of Cybersecurity and Communications Assistant Secretary, 
“Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland,” Testimony before the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure 
Protection and Security Technologies hearing, February 12, 2015. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/1
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incidents.  Senator Christopher Coons from Delaware pointed out, “The bill 
would allow the Guard to respond to cyber disasters just as it does to natural 
disasters.”9   In an address to the National Governors Association, Colorado 
Governor John Hickenlooper stated “the National Guard should be mobilized 
to support federal and state efforts to protect critical infrastructure networks 
and respond to cyber incidents.”10  In the 2015 National Defense 
Authorization Act, the National Guard has now been authorized to establish 
more cyber mission teams (11 Army and 12 Air Guard), primarily to defend 
critical cyber networks against attacks from adversaries.   
 
The National Guard forces can be activated for federal service under Title 10 
US code or to perform state service under Title 32 US code.  The dual status of 
the National Guard forces makes them a distinctive state homeland defense 
asset with direct access to Department of Defense (DoD) classified threat 
information and a national level multi-agency collaboration network.  With 
federal funding, the National Guard Cyber Mission Forces are able to 
maintain their skills through participation in DoD sponsored exercises such 
as Cyber Guard which focuses on cyber defense of critical infrastructure.  The 
National Guard force is 75 percent part-time military members who work full-
time in the civilian workforce.  This means many of the cyber defender 
guardsmen likely work in some of the critical infrastructure industries.  
 
The government is unable to use federal military forces to enforce civil laws 
under the Posse Comitatus Act.  However National Guard forces operating 
under the state authority of Title 32 are exempt from Posse Comitatus Act 
restrictions.  Title 32 Section 902 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to 
“provide funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to 
conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines to be 
necessary and appropriate.”11  Even though most of the funding for National 
Guard equipment and training comes from federal sources, National Guard 
personnel and equipment are not “federalized” and therefore are available to 
the Governor in state or local emergencies.12  The statute defines “homeland 
defense activities” as activities “undertaken for the military protection of the 
territory or domestic population of the United States, or of the infrastructure 
or other assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as 
                                                          
9 William Matthews, “Cyber Uncertainty.” 
10 Ibid 
11 US Code Title 32 Chapter 9 Section 902, “National Guard: Homeland Defense 
Activities: Definitions,” available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/32/902 
12 Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Lowenberg, “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense 
and Homeland Security,” National Guard Association of the United States, no date, 
available at: http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf .  
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being critical to national security, from a threat or aggression against the 
US.”13   
 
In many states, the Director of Homeland Security is the Lieutenant Governor 
who can recall troops to provide critical infrastructure defense through state 
funded or federal funded roles.  Washington is one state whose government 
has established a critical infrastructure cyber defense capability in its 
National Guard network warfare units.14  Washington state government 
statutes assign the state’s emergency management to the Adjutant General 
and military department of the state which oversee cyber incidents 
threatening state or national security.  They also offer their private and public 
utilities providers free penetration analysis and vulnerability assessments 
through partnerships to collectively defend those networks controlling critical 
infrastructure assets.    
 
Currently Maryland, Michigan and California also have National Guard cyber 
mission forces and are developing frameworks to use those forces in a state 
role to defend critical infrastructure with private industry.  In California, a 
joint Computer Network Defense Team performs vulnerability assessments, 
risk identification, incident response and other services for state agencies free 
of charge. The state also has an Air Guard Network Warfare Squadron that 
can be called on by the governor to test the security of state networks.15  
 
In Maryland, the Air National Guard Network Warfare Squadron performs 
security assessments on state computer networks.  The squadron teams with 
state agencies to launch simulated attacks against state networks.  When they 
succeed, the squadron helps develop countermeasures to block future 
attacks.16  These are the type of partnerships that many other state 
governments are wanting to develop with trained cyber defenders who can aid 
in thwarting the constant evolving threat posed on the most critical and 
vulnerable networks; however, federal appropriations have limited the 
current number of cyber forces. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 US Code Title 32 Chapter 9 Section 901, “National Guard: Homeland Defense 
Activities: Definitions,” available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/32/901 
14 A. Kambour, “Enhancing the Cybersecurity of Energy Systems and Infrastructure.”  
15 William Matthews, “Cyber Uncertainty.” 
16 Ibid 
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Critical Infrastructure Cyber Defense Model Based on Private-
Public Partnership Concept  
For a number of years the US government has been stressing the importance 
of government and private industry to work together in partnerships in order 
to secure this nation’s critical infrastructure.  This need for private-public 
cyber defense partnerships is a thread which has carried through the 2002 
National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space, and continues through the 2006 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and President Obama's 2009 
Cyber Space Policy Review.17  One can therefore deduce that cyber defense in 
critical infrastructure protection depends heavily on effective private-public 
partnerships (PPPs).   
 
Our literature review and interviews with National Guard and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) cyber defense teams and private critical 
infrastructure providers exposed four recurring key features for effective 
PPPs: relationships, competency, shared equities and governance. We 
combined these aspects into a model that constitutes successful critical 
infrastructure cyber defense (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Critical Infrastructure Cyber Defense Model 
 
While trust is not explicitly included in the model, three of the four main 
factors in the model relate to trust.  However, according to academic 
literature, trust takes time to develop in a partnership and is multi-faceted.18  
In his testimony before the House subcommittee on cybersecurity, Andy 
Ozment of NPPD pointed out that if public-private trust is broken, the open 
                                                          
17 Larry Clinton, “A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for 
Cyber Defense,” Journal of Strategic Security 4: 2 (2011): 98, available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.6. 
18 Nathan E.Busch, , and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships.”  
Claus et al.: Newest National Defense
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information exchange critical to the Cyber Information Sharing and 
Collaboration Program, which provides a trusted information sharing 
environment for private sector partners to share information and collaborate 
on cyber security threats, will not occur.19  We now further explore the role of 
each model feature. 
 
Relationships 
Relationships between the private and public organizations play a key role in 
the partnership, and the length of time those relationships have been 
established ties to the trust level between partners.  The length of time and 
amount of interaction within previously established relationships amongst 
partner organizations can also impact the amount of time necessary to 
establish trust.20  Having those trusting working relationships in place is 
helpful during routine operations, but invaluable during crisis.21 
 
Emerging National Guard cyber mission forces can learn from various cyber 
defense partnerships.  For example, USCYBERCOM cyber defense teams 
work with private defense contractors in the Defense Industry Base critical 
infrastructure sector to develop private-public partnerships to defend critical 
information networks.  The DHS NCCIC US-Cyber Emergency Response 
Team (US-CERT) and ICS-CERT partner with private critical infrastructure 
industry for cyber defense, as do the four states with National Guard units 
who have already partnered with critical infrastructure providers to provide 
vulnerability assessments and penetration testing for cyber defense incident 
response and cooperative exercises.   
 
Shared Equities  
Prior research indicates that when trust is low, transaction costs rise, which 
inhibits information exchange.22  Explicit strategies to address these 
perceptions of risk are critical to success when information exchange is 
required for effective collaboration.23  Sharing threat information, 
vulnerability data, or incident reporting are good practices for cyber defense 
                                                          
19 Andy Ozment, “Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland.”  
20 Sharon S.Dawes, , Anthony M. Cresswell, and Theresa A. Pardo, "From “Need to Know” 
to “Need to Share”: Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of 
Public Sector Knowledge Networks," Public Administration Review 69:3 (2009): 397. 
21 Nathan E.Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships.” 
22 Candace Jones, William S Hesterly, and Stephen P Borgatti, “A General Theory of 
Network Governance Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms,” Academy of 
Management Review 12:4(1997): 911. 
23 Sharon S. Dawes, Anthony M. Cresswell, and Theresa A. Pardo, “From ‘need to know’”. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 4
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of critical infrastructure and partnerships as well.24  However, sometimes 
allowing information to be shared anonymously can facilitate a more open 
information exchange environment.   
 
The DHS understands how crucial information sharing within a partnership 
between federal agencies and private entities is to effective critical 
infrastructure cyber defense.25  According to a DHS US-CERT representative, 
one of the keys to establishing trust and open information exchange is the 
cooperative research and development agreements established with their 
cyber defense partners.26  Those collaboratively produced documents ensure 
that the private industry critical infrastructure cyber defense partner 
understands the information voluntarily shared in the partnership will only 
be used to enhance its cyber defense and will not be shared with regulatory 
agencies in accordance with the Critical Infrastructure Information Act.27  
Many private critical infrastructure providers are currently unaware that 
those protections exist which leads to a reluctance to voluntarily share cyber 
incident or vulnerability information.28    
 
Competency 
An organization’s competency and a partner’s perception of how competent 
that organization is also add to the trust equation in a partnership.  An 
organization’s competency can be measured by others through the skill level 
of its employees, the organization’s external reputation, its leadership 
practices and the organization’s internal processes. 
 
Competency of an organization in a private-public partnership can also 
include its ability to safeguard information.  The DHS has established the 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program based on 
information protection legislation in the 2002 Critical Information Act.  PCII 
protections mean that homeland security partners can be confident that 
                                                          
24 European Network and Information Security Agency, “Cooperative Models for Effective 
Public Private Partnership: Good Practice Guide,” available at: 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/public-private-
partnership/national-public-private-partnerships-ppps/good-practice-guide-on-
cooperatve-models-for-effective-ppps. 
25 Andy Ozment, “Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland.”  
26 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency 
Response Team representative, April 6, 2015. 
27 Department of Homeland Security Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 
homepage, updated June 18, 2014, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/protected-critical-
infrastructure-information-pcii-program. 
28 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency 
Response Team representative, April 6, 2015. 
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sharing their information with the government will not expose sensitive or 
proprietary data.29  Even though government cyber defense organizations are 
bound to protect collected information and not share it with regulatory 
agencies, many private organizations in partnerships still do not have a 
feeling of sustained trust.30  This feeling of distrust could also result from 
private critical infrastructure companies’ lack of understanding of what 
protections the Critical Information Act of 2002 and the PCII program afford 
with regard to the information they volunteer and what cyber defenders 
find.31 
 
Competency can be developed and maintained through regular collaborative 
training exercises so that both sides of the partnership can better understand 
each other’s capabilities.  The Washington state emergency management 
division regularly runs collaborative cybersecurity and defense tabletop 
exercises with state government leadership, state emergency management, 
National Guard cyber mission forces, and private critical infrastructure 
providers in order to comprehend the severity of cyber threats, and practice 
methods to mitigate those threats.  
 
Cyber Guard is a joint cyberspace training exercise focused on national 
defensive cyberspace operations whole-of-government approach with a state 
response and a larger federal response to significant cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure.  This annual exercise brings together National Guard, 
CYBERCOM, DHS, FBI and state Joint Operations Centers in order to better 
understand each other’s capabilities and processes.32  Participation in these 
training exercises by private and public organizations could also help develop 
trust and encourage private-public partnership participation for cyber defense 
through better understanding of each organization’s competency.  Securing 
ICS protocols on industry networks requires specialized training and 
certifications separate from defending an industry’s information networks.  
Cyber Guard focuses on developing knowledge and joint processes to be 
competent to defend those types of systems. 
 
                                                          
29 Department of Homeland Security, “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 
Program Fact Sheet,” July 2014, available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PCII-Fact-Sheet-2014-508.pdf. 
30 Department of Homeland Security Integrated Task Force, “Evaluation of Existing 
Public-Private Partnership Model,” July 12, 2013, available at: 
https://www.chicagofirst.org/resources/dhs_partnership_report.pdf. 
31 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency 
Response Team representative, Apr 6, 2015. 
32 US Cyber Command, “Cyber Guard 13-1 After Action Report,” Feb 7, 2014. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 4
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In 2012, the Michigan state government partnered with academia and 
industry to create a public-private cyber range because they felt that would 
help improve cyber defense competency between their National Guard cyber 
mission teams and the private sector.  Michigan Chief Information Officer 
hopes the cyber exercise range will strengthen the state of Michigan’s cyber-
readiness and foster stronger private-public partnerships for cyber defense of 
critical infrastructure.33  
 
Governance       
Governance in critical infrastructure cyber defense currently mandates that 
government agencies share information on cyber threat data, guidelines, and 
best practices; however, information sharing by private critical infrastructure 
providers is voluntary.  Regulations do exist, requiring critical infrastructure 
networks to be in compliance with reliability standards set by regulatory 
organizations.  The subject then becomes how understandable and 
enforceable the regulations and mandatory standards are.  If one government 
agency is charged to enforce those mandatory standards, what keeps a non-
regulatory government agency such as a National Guard cyber mission team 
from turning in a non-compliant private partner for that non-compliance?  
This returns to the issue of partners understanding each other’s processes, 
particularly with regard to handling and protecting sensitive information and 
only providing that information to those with a legitimate need to know.  
 
Due to the increasing threat of cyber incidents to cause significant damage to 
critical infrastructure, some states have passed legislation to better defend 
critical infrastructure from cyberattack and drafted cyber annexes to their 
state emergency action plans.  The state of Washington’s cyber annex to their 
state emergency action plan designates the state Homeland Security Advisor 
as the lead for any significant cyber incident.  That state Homeland Security 
Advisor coordinates the cyber incident response with the help of state Cyber 
Unified Coordination Group consisting of various state government cyber 
security officials, law enforcement, cyber academia, the lead National Guard 
cyber planner, and private industry critical infrastructure key resources 
representatives.34 
                                                          
33 Colin Wood, “Cybersecurity Gets a Boost from the National Guard,” Emergency 
Management, March 3, 2014, available at: 
http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Cybersecurity-National-Guard.html?page=1. 
34 State of Washington, “Washington State Significant Cyber Incident Annex to the 
Washington State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Annex D,” March 4, 
2015: 7-8, available at: 
http://mil.wa.gov/uploads/pdf/PLANS/wastatesignificantcyberincidentannex2015032
4.pdf. 
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Research Method 
Yin’s methods35 were followed to perform a single case study of critical 
infrastructure cyber defense to validate the key aspects of effective PPPs 
highlighted in the literature review and initial interviews.  Another goal of the 
case study was to discover how emerging National Guard CMTs could build 
effective PPPs by focusing on the main aspects of the critical infrastructure 
cyber defense model.  Our units of analysis were four current and future cyber 
defenders from National Guard and DHS and five public/private critical 
infrastructure providers.  We used the four main factors of relationships, 
competency, shared equities and governance, from our model as our 
propositions to study (see Attachment 1) and developed a questionnaire (see 
Attachment 2) as a mechanism to link data to the propositions and interpret 
findings.  All respondents answered the same set of questions.  Some of the 
respondents have performed critical infrastructure cyber defense in response 
to actual cyber incidents and others have performed cyber defense as a 
partner organization during Cyber Guard training exercises.  
 
Discussion 
Through interviews and questionnaire responses, the overarching theme that 
resounded throughout Subject Matter Expert (SME) responses was that PPPs 
are very important for an effective critical infrastructure cyber defense.  An 
effective PPP cannot exist unless mutual trust is established between the 
partner organizations and relationships are key to establishing that trust.  
Both federal government and private industry officials stated that those 
relationships and the necessary trust building takes time and is typically only 
effective with personal contacts between the organizations.36  Most 
respondents felt having a liaison in their partner organizations would improve 
the effectiveness of the critical infrastructure cyber defense partnership.  Only 
one public critical infrastructure provider felt liaisons would not improve 
cyber defense partnerships and that was the only respondent who stated 
he/she currently utilizes liaisons.  This response clearly emphasizes the need 
to better understand and develop the role of an effective liaison in PPPs. 
 
Most of the respondents from both private and public felt that transparent 
information exchange is an important factor for cyber defense partnerships.  
                                                          
35 Robert K. Yin, “Case Study Research: Design and Methods,”Sage Publications, 2013: 
28-29. 
36 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team representative, April 6, 2015. 
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Currently private critical infrastructure providers are eager to receive 
government provided cyber threat information; however, many, especially 
those large enough to provide internal cyber defense for their networks, are 
reluctant to openly reciprocate that information exchange.  Most private 
critical infrastructure providers are worried the government agency providing 
the cyber defense support will turn their voluntarily shared network 
vulnerability data over to a regulatory government agency.37  National Guard 
critical infrastructure cyber defenders need to give special attention to those 
information protection concerns.  These concerns warrant taking the time to 
communicate with critical infrastructure providers how data observed during 
vulnerability analysis and other cyber defense activities is protected by the 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Act.  Dealing with that concern 
in this manner should help build more trust since all respondents to the 
questionnaire felt knowledge of their partner organization’s information 
protection procedures would promote information exchange rather than 
impede it.  Implementing a practice similar to the DHS written cooperative 
trust agreements could address that concern and strengthen partnership 
trust. 
 
Both sides agreed security classification of cyber threat data was a common 
impediment to information exchange.  One critical infrastructure provider 
pointed out it is difficult to convince management to implement different, 
sometimes costly, security practices when one is not able to share the threat 
information with them.  It would also be helpful to know which cyber threat 
information can be shared with other government organizations within the 
partnership because that is not always clear.38  One way DHS has dealt with 
that issue is by using state protective security advisors to work with and 
sponsor private infrastructure providers for security clearances.39  The 
National Guard should use close community ties to provide that same service 
to help bridge the gap between government providers of cyber threat data and 
private critical infrastructure providers.  
 
All respondents except for one National Guard cyber defender felt it was 
important that legislation, standards and policies are easy to interpret.  
However, four out of the five critical infrastructure providers and one out of 
three National Guard cyber defenders felt current standards are easy to 
                                                          
37 Interview with anonymous critical infrastructure provider representative, April 9, 2015. 
38 Interview with local Omaha critical infrastructure provider cybersecurity 
representative, April 22, 2015. 
39 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team representative, April 6, 2015. 
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implement.  National Guard cyber teams should be prepared to act as 
interpreters of standards and policies.   
 
Another way the National Guard cyber teams can bridge the gap between 
government agencies and the public-private critical infrastructure providers is 
acting as a fusion cell to interpret the many government cyber threat feeds 
and filter out the most serious threats to critical infrastructure providers.  As 
a fusion cell for cyber threat analysis, the National Guard cyber teams could 
also provide forensics of the thousands of malware attacks critical 
infrastructure providers face and interpret which attacks are malicious and 
severe enough to recommend spending resources to defend against them.40 
 
Interestingly, most of the respondents felt their own personnel did not have 
the necessary expertise and training for critical infrastructure cyber defense.  
National Guard cyber teams should be aware that a majority of the partners 
see joint cyber defense training exercises, such as Cyber Guard, as important 
for improving cyber defense partnership capabilities.  Most respondents are 
interested in third parties such as local universities providing mock 
ICS/SCADA networks or Michigan’s state-wide cyber range as mediums for 
that collaborative joint training.  National Guard cyber teams should 
investigate these third party training opportunities to help forge effective 
cyber PPPs.  
 
Some threats to the validity of our findings were the short amount of time 
allowed for this study, only three months, and the small sampling of SMEs 
available to answer the questionnaire.  Future studies should attempt to 
question more subjects from a variety of critical infrastructure providers.  
 
Conclusions 
More remote access to industry information technology systems has made the 
ICS protocols which regulate daily operations on the nation’s critical 
infrastructure cyber networks more vulnerable to outside attack.  Federal and 
state governments have always had the authority to use National Guard forces 
to physically defend critical infrastructure and key resources vital to the 
nation’s interests and way of life.  Many state governments feel cyber defense 
of the networks controlling that critical infrastructure is not much different, 
which makes cyber defense of critical infrastructure a lucrative role for the 
National Guard cyber mission forces that state governments are working to 
                                                          
40 Interview with local Omaha critical infrastructure provider cybersecurity 
representative, April 22, 2015. 
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develop.  Due to the privatization of most of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure, the National Guard CMTs will have to develop effective 
private-public partnerships with those private industries in order to be 
successful in this new mission set vital to our nation’s security.  Based upon 
this case study, the critical infrastructure cyber defense model provides a 
good guide for National Guard cyber mission teams to reference when 
developing private-public partnerships to perform their mission effectively.  
National Guard CMTs should build upon their current community 
relationships to establish written agreements with critical infrastructure 
partners to develop the underlying trust that encourages information sharing.  
They should also use those same community relationships with academia and 
industry to create third party training networks for all partners to promote a 
collaborative learning environment for a more effective critical infrastructure 
cyber defense and stronger trusting partnerships.   
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Appendix 1. Case Study Propositions 
 
 
Proposition 
Categories Propositions 
1. 
Relationships 
Having an established relationship between private and public 
partners, no matter the type, builds trust which leads to a more 
effective mission than only assembly the partnership in crisis 
1.a. Whether partner relationships are formal or informal does not 
matter, but rather is the existence of a relationship affects trust. 
1.b. Long term relationships with frequent partner interaction 
establish a more effective partnership than reactionary short term 
crisis relationships. 
1.c. Previous existence of a relationship between partner organizations 
leads to more trust established. 
2. Shared 
Equities 
The partners in the cyber defense private-public partnership must 
share some equities to establish and maintain trust.  
2.a. There is a sense of shared goals and benefits.  Partners depend 
upon each other to accomplish these common goals. 
2.b. Risk should be evenly shared amongst the partners in order to 
establish trust. 
2.c. Free exchange of information is critical to an effective cyber 
defense partnership.  Trust between partners is critical for this 
information sharing to occur. 
2.d. Evenly distributed and understood responsibilities and 
accountability amongst the cyber defense partnership are important to 
establish trust. 
3. Competency The ability for partners to perform their responsibilities competently. 
3.a. Knowledge of partner's cyber defense capabilities is critical to 
developing trust in the partnership.  
3.b. Both sides of the private-public partnership are lacking proper 
training to effectively perform cyber defense mission and require 
knowledge from their partner organization. 
3.c. Knowledge of partner's cyber defense and information protection 
processes are important to establish and maintain partnership trust.  
4. Governance Compliance standards and regulations for critical infrastructure 
providers are necessary for effective cyber defense. 
4.a. Legislation and standards must be easily understood in order to 
effectively be implemented. 
4.b.  Mismatched information sharing (required for government 
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agencies and voluntary for private/public critical infrastructure 
companies) hampers the partnership. 
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire Relationship to Propositions 
 
 
Propositions correlated to Questionnaire Questions 
Questions 1 1a 1b 1c 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 3a 3b 3c 4 4a 4b 
Q1: Are you aware of any 
private-public (govt) 
partnerships in your 
organization for 
cybersecurity?   X X X X                         
      Q1.1  Please select the 
nature of those private-
public partnerships for 
cyber defense (you may 
choose multiple 
answers).  Formal, 
informal, long-term, 
short-term                                 
     Q1.2: Are these 
partnerships 
documented in a memo 
of agreement or joint 
policies?    X X X X                   X     
     Q1.3 How many cyber 
defense partnerships 
does your organization 
currently participate in? X                               
      Q1.4 How important 
are private-public 
partnerships for effective 
critical infrastructure 
cyber defense? X         X       X             
Q2: Do you think having 
a liaison in a partner’s 
organization would 
improve a cyber-defense 
partnership?   X         X X X X   X           
     Q2.1: Does your 
organization currently 
have a liaison position 
for coordinating cyber 
defense activities?   X         X X X X   X           
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Q3 How much does the 
cyber defense 
competency of the 
partner organization 
matter for your 
responsibilities to 
protect key critical 
infrastructure elements?  X                 X             
     Q3.1 How important 
is it to know about the 
cyber defense 
capabilities a partner 
organization can 
provide?   X                 X X           
    Q3.2 Provide some 
examples of desirable 
capabilities?                      X           
    Q3.3 How important is 
it that your cyber defense 
partner organization 
participates in ongoing 
cyber defense training to 
maintain current 
knowledge and skills?                   X   X         
      Q3.3.1 Do you feel 
your own personnel have 
the necessary expertise 
and training to defend 
critical infrastructure 
networks?                   X   X X       
     Q3.4 How important 
are joint training 
exercises/practice for 
cyber defense or incident 
response be for 
improving mutual 
awareness of 
capabilities?            X       X X X         
    Q3.5 How desirable 
would it be to have a 
third party (e.g.                       X         
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University) provide a 
mock Industrial Control 
Systems network for 
cyber defense education 
and training? 
Q4 How important do 
you think it is to share 
transparently, with 
attribution, all pertinent 
information 
(vulnerabilities, 
incidents, threat 
information) with other 
partners for an effective 
cyber defense 
partnership?           X     X                 
Q5 Would you be more 
willing to share 
information cyber 
defense information 
(threat, vulnerabilities, 
attack trends, etc.), if 
shared anonymously?          X     X                 
Q6 Rate the following 
issues for their ability to 
hamper information 
sharing:    1. Security 
Classification of cyber 
threat information, 
2.Disclosure of 
previously known 
vulnerabilities, 3. Private 
industry competitive 
edge, 4. Collaboratively 
developed information 
sharing agreements 
between public and 
private partners, 5. 
Ability to anonymously 
share information, 6. 
Knowledge of partner's         X     X                 
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cyber defense 
capabilities, 7. 
Knowledge of cyber 
defense partner's  
information protection 
practices, 8. Attribution 
tied to information 
source, 9. NIST 
standards for critical 
infrastructure cyber 
defense 
    Q6.1 Are there any 
other factors that 
influence information 
sharing in a cyber-
defense partnership?         X     X                 
Q7 How important is it 
to understand the 
methods for protecting 
sensitive information 
used by your partner 
organization in a cyber-
defense partnership ?               X         X       
     Q7.1 Your 
organization has 
established procedures 
for protecting sensitive 
information pertaining 
to critical infrastructure 
cyber defense? 
(Disagree/Agree)               X         X X   X 
       Q7.1.1 Other 
organizations in your 
cyber defense 
partnership are familiar 
with your sensitive 
information protection 
policies and methods.  
(Disagree/Agree)               X     X   X X   X 
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    Q7.2 I trust the 
organizations in a cyber-
defense partnership for 
their ability to provide 
the same level of 
protection for sensitive 
information. 
(Disagree/Agree)                   X     X       
Q8 Voluntary 
requirements for private 
companies to share cyber 
defense information are 
sufficient for effective 
cyber defense of critical 
infrastructure. 
(Disagree/Agree)               X           X   X 
   Q8.1 There should be 
more legislation for 
private companies 
mandating sharing of 
cyber defense 
information with 
relevant partners?  
(Disagree/Agree)               X           X   X 
Q9: How important are 
the following aspects to 
establishing/maintaining 
an effective critical 
infrastructure cyber 
defense partnership?   1. 
Share Risk, 2. Incentives, 
3. All cyber defense 
partners share common 
cyber defense goals, 4. 
All cyber defense 
partners understand 
their own organization's 
cyber defense roles and 
responsibilities, 5. All 
cyber defense partners 
understand each other's         X X     X   X   X       
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cyber defense roles and 
responsibilities, 6. All 
cyber defense partners 
are held equally 
accountable to their 
responsibilities in the 
partnership 
    Q9.1 Should this risk 
be evenly distributed 
across the partner 
organizations?         X   X                   
     Q9.2 What are some 
incentives that will likely 
improve participation in 
cyber defense private 
public partnerships?               X                 
Q10. How important are 
outsourced cyber 
security activities are 
effective for critical 
infrastructure cyber 
defense X         X     X               
   Q10.1 State sponsored 
Cyber Protection Teams 
are equally effective for 
critical infrastructure 
cyber defense.  
(Disagree/Agree) X         X     X               
      Q10.1.1 What are 
some reasons for your 
response? X         X     X               
Q11. How important to 
critical infrastructure 
cyber defense are easily 
interpreted legislation 
and policies? .                         X X X   
     Q11.1 I believe current 
regulatory penalties for 
non-compliance with 
critical infrastructure 
cyber network standards                           X   X 
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are sufficient for critical 
infrastructure providers. 
(Disagree/Agree) 
      Q11.2  National 
Institute of Standards 
and Technology 
standards for critical 
infrastructure cyber 
defense are easy to 
implement. 
(Disagree/Agree)                           X   X 
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